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1952] NOTES 503
is found in the time separating the shooting, which took place
on the tracks, from the time of the arrest, which occurred in the
station house. In neither of these cases did the court indicate
that the element of time separating the two events was a basis
for its decision, but this factor might well have influenced the
court in finding separate and distinct offenses not arising out of
the same circumstances.
One very obvious effect of the present inflationary spiral
has been the sharp increase in the proportion of civil cases now
going on appeal to the supreme court. In recognition of this the
Louisiana State Law Institute, in its projet of a new state consti-
tution, has proposed an increase of the supreme court's jurisdic-
tional minimum from $2000 to $8000.12 In providing a badly-
needed limitation on the jurisdiction of Louisiana's highest court,
and in affording a more even distribution of appeals among the
four appellate courts, the result of the Cavalier case should
prove desirable. Its overruling of the Newsom and Applewhite
cases, however, leaves some rather difficult questions unan-
swered.13
Ronald Lee Davis, Jr.
PROCEDURE-WAIVABILITY OF JURISDICTION
RATIONE PERSONAE
Plaintiff filed suit in Union Parish against residents of Clai-
borne Parish, who were properly cited therein. A preliminary
12. Projet of Constitution of Louisiana, Louisiana State Law Institute,
Art. VI, § 16(3) (1950).
13. Suppose that under the facts of the principal case there had been
a month's interval of time between the assault and battery and the defama-
tion, but that there was a direct causal connection between the two offenses.
Would the claim for the defamation be deemed to arise "out of the same
circumstances" as the claim for damages for the assault and battery, within
the contemplation of the constitutional provision? If so, then the rationale
of the Cavalier case is causal connexity, rather than any test as to the simul-
taneous or continuous nature of the circumstances upon which the two
causes of action are based. Compare Searcy v. Interurban Transp. Co., 179
So. 93 (La. App. 1937).
Until these and similar questions have been answered, it is recom-
mended that under circumstances similar to the principal case, the, appeal
on both causes of action be prosecuted to the proper court of appeal, which
would clearly have jurisdiction, at least as to the physical injury action.
Then, ,even if the intermediate appellate court held the other action to fall
within the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, the court of appeal
could review the physical injury action and then transfer the balance of the
case to the supreme court, under La. R.S. (1950) 13:4440. Cf. State v. J. Foto
& Bros., 134 La. 153, 63 So. 859 (1913).
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default was taken, and upon subsequent motion for confirmation,
the district court held that it was without jurisdiction ratione
personae and dismissed the suit. Held, affirmed. Article 162 of
the Louisiana Code of Practice1 expressly provides that the defen-
dant must be sued at his domicile and if suit be brought else-
where the defendant is under no compulsion to remind the court
of its lack of jurisdiction. Automobile Insurance Company of
Hartford v. Thornton, 56 So. 2d 308 (La. App. 1952).
The most obvious effect of the instant decision is to render
nugatory the clear intendment of Article 93 of the Code of Prac-
tice,2 providing that an exception to the jurisdiction of the court
based on domicile must be tendered in limine. The court stated,
"In order to sustain plaintiff's contention it will be necessary to
hold that the provisions of Articles 93 and 3333 of the Code of
Practice . . . supersede the clear provision of Article 162." 4 It is
submitted that there is nothing in these articles which is at all
inconsistent. 5 It is, of course, generally true that a defendant has
the right to be sued at his domicile. However, it is also a fact that
this right is personal and if the defendant fails to exercise it, no
one suffers but himself.6 A long line of cases apply Article 93
and hence are contrary to the present holding.
7
1. "It is a general rule in civil matters that one must be sued before his
own judge, that is to say, before the judge having jurisdiction over the place
where he has his domicil or residence, and shall not be permitted to elect
any other domicil or residence for the purpose of being sued, but this rule
is subject to those exceptions expressly provided for by law." Art. 162, La.
Code of Practice of 1870.
2. "If one be cited before a judge whose jurisdiction does not extend to
the place of his domicil, or of his usual residence, but who is competent to
decide the cause brought before him, and he plead to the merit, instead of
declining the jurisdiction, the judgment given shall be valid, except the
defendant be a minor." Art. 93, La. Code of Practice of 1870. While, Article
93 does not deal specifically with a judgment by default, it is submitted that
no distinction should be made, in view of the language of 333(2), La. Code
of Practice of 1870, quoted infra note 3.
3. "It is a rule which governs in all cases of exceptions, except in such as
relate to the absolute incompetency of the judge before whom the suit is
brought, that they must be pleaded specially in limine litis, before issue
joined, otherwise they shall not be admitted.
"Hereafter no dilatory exceptions shall be allowed in any case after a
judgment by default has been taken; and in every case they must be pleaded
in limine litis at one and the same time, otherwise they shall not be admitted;
nor shall such exceptions hereafter be allowed in any answer in any cause.
"No dilatory exception shall be allowed in any pending case unless the
same shall be filed within ten days from the time this Act becomes effective."
Art. 333, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
4. 56 So. 2d 308, 309 (La. App. 1952).
5. Marqueze v. LeBlanc, 29 La. Ann. 194 (1877) and Phipps v. Snodgrass,
31 La. Ann. 88 (1879) specifically state that there is no conflict.
6. See Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 210, 212 (1952).
7. McAlpine v. Jones, 13 La. Ann. 409 (1858); Tegarden v. Powell, 15 La.
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It is possible that the background for the Thornton decision
is to be found in Mitcham v. Mitcham" and Bercegeay v. Teche-
land Oil CompanyY In'those cases the supreme court held that
the fact that mandatory language is employed in Article 165 of
the Code of Practice41 renders those rules non-waivable. While
the writer seriously questions the soundness of those decisions,"
even if they be accepted the instant holding is not a necessary
sequel. In the Mitcham and Bercegeay cases the rationale was
that the mandatory provisions of Article 165 referred to jurisdic-
tion ratione materiae, the lack of which can be pleaded at any
time.1 2 It is apparent that the court of appeal did not follow this
line of reasoning in the case noted, since it referred only to juris-
diction ratione personae. The court relied on the clause of Article
162 which declares that the defendant is expressly prohibited
from choosing any place other than his domicile for the purpose
of being sued. Several cases13 have held, however, that this lan-
guage means no more than that parties are prohibited from
confecting an agreement designating a place for the institution
of a prospective suit. It has no relation at all to a suit actually
pending and hence is not in disaccord with Article 93.
The Thornton holding also raises the insoluble riddle of
which court will have jurisdiction in the face of two mandatory
provisions designating different places for the cause to be tried.1
4
The logic of the case would seemingly preclude either court from
hearing the cause,' 5 yet it is obvious that the draftsmen of the
code intended no such anomaly. The writer asserts that "must"
as used in Article 162 means only that suit must be brought at
the defendant's domicile if the defendant insists upon it, that is,
Ann. 184 (1860); Marqueze v. LeBlanc, 29 La. Ann. 194 (1877); Phipps v.
Snodgrass, 31 La. Ann. 88 (1879); Goodrich v. Hunton, 31 La. Ann. 582 (1879);
Tupery v. Edmonson, 32 La. Ann. 1146 (1880); Stevenson v. Whitney, 33 La.
Ann. 655 (1881); Stackhouse v. Zuntz, 36 La. Ann. 529 (1884); Lyons v. Kelly,
40 La. Ann. 498, 4 So. 480 (1888); Atkins v. Scarborough, 52 La. Ann. 800, 27
So. 134 (1899); Bernstein v. Dalton: Clark Stave Co., 122 La. 412, 47 So. 753
(1908); Zeller v. Louisiana Cypress Lbr. Co., 9 La. App. 609, 121 So. 670 (1929).
8. 186 La. 641, 173 So. 132 (1937).
9. 209 La. 33, 24 So. 2d 242 (1945), noted in 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 437
(1947).
10. Providing a number of exceptions to the general rule of Article 162.
11. See Comment, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 210, 215 et seq. (1952).
12. Art. 92, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
13. Marqueze v. LeBlanc, 29 La. Ann. 194 (1877); Phipps v. Snodgrass,
31 La. Ann. 88 (1879). See also concurring opinion in School Board v. Weber,
30 La. Ann. 593 (1878).
14. For example, two of the "must" provisions of Article 165.
15. See McMahon, Louisiana Practice 13, § 5, n. 15.1 (Supp. 1949) and 7
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 262, 263 (1947); Note, 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 437 (1947).
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by raising timely objection to a suit brought in another parish.16
In cases of conflicting statutory enactments, prior decisions
allowed the plaintiff to choose the tribunal.17
Apparently the only jurisprudential authority relied on by
the court is Franek v. Turner.8 Pretermitting a discussion of the
merits of that decision,19 suffice it to say that the majority opin-
ion itself would not seem to bear out the reliance put upon it.
Chief Justice O'Niell, speaking for the court, expressly recog-
nized the rule which the instant case discards: "As a general
rule, a defendant who is sued in a court that has not jurisdiction
over him personally becomes liable to have a personal judgment
rendered against him if, being cited personally, he does not take
exception in limine litis to the jurisdiction of the court. But that
rule is not applicable to this case, because the court in which
[defendant] was sued did have jurisdiction over the case, to the
extent of the value of the property that was provisionally
seized." 20 (Italics supplied.) There is no attempt by the court
to place the Thornton case into the exception which Franek v.
Turner represents.
One further statement of the court deserves comment: "To
our way of thinking there is no more reason for requiring a
plea to the jurisdiction by a non-resident of a parish who is
personally served within such parish than there would be for
requiring such a plea by a non-resident of the State, served
without the State." 21
When used in the interstate sense, jurisdiction over the per-
son does not correspond, in the writer's opinion, with jurisdic-
tion ratione personae. The latter, it is submitted, is the equiva-
lent to the common law term venue, and means only "the place
where the suit is to be brought." The former, on the other hand,
draws in a constitutional question, namely, whether the defen-
dant has been properly brought before the court.22 In this
regard, the Supreme Court of the United States announced, in
16. See Comment, 12 LOuISIANA LAW REVIEW 210, 215 (1952).
17. Williams' Heirs v. Zengel, 117 La. 599, 42 So. 153 (1906); Rathborne
Lumber Co. v. Cooper, 164 La. 502, 114 So. 112 (1927); Esmele v. Violet Trap-
ping Co., 187 La. 728, 175 So. 471 (1937). In these cases, however, both pro-
visions were not "mandatory."
18. 164 La. 532, 114 So. 148 (1927).
19. It is understood that the rule of Franek v. Turner will be overturned
in the revision of the Code of Practice.
20. 164 La. 532, 537, 114 So. 148, 149.
21. 56 So. 2d 308, 311 (La. App. 1952).
22. See Comment, 12 LOUIsIANA LAW REVIEW 210, 211 et seq. (1952).
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Pennoyer v. Neff,23 the doctrine that, if personal service cannot
be made upon the defendant within the state, his property must
be attached prior to the institution of suit. This procedure creates
jurisdiction only up to the value of the property, hence the action
is one in rem. It would seem, therefore, that the analogy the
court attempts to, draw should fail. For the same reason, the
court's statement that the interpretation placed on Article 163,
providing for jurisdiction in rem, should be indicative of the
interpretation to be given Article 162,24 would not appear to be
valid. Again, the reasoning would seem to be open to the criti-
cism that one article applies to jurisdiction in rem, the other
to jurisdiction in personam.
It is hoped that the court will revert to the position taken
by the prior jurisprudence on this question, and by the late
Judge Taliaferro, dissenting in the present decision.
Robert Roberts III
SALES-RESCISSION FOR MISREPRESENTATION-
FRAUD PRACTICED BY VENDOR
Plaintiff sued to rescind an act of sale of certain real prop-
erty, alleging that the defendants misrepresented the amount of
legally collectible rents which they were receiving from said
property. The district court sustained defendants' exception of
no cause or ,no right of action. The supreme court on the first
hearing affirmed, but on rehearing reversed itself and set aside
its former decree. Held, allegations that plaintiff was induced to
purchase an apartment house by vendors' misrepresentations as
to legally collectible rentals stated a cause of action against
vendors for rescission attributable to error of fact relating to the
principal cause, and error of fact induced by fraud. Overby v.
Beach, 55 So. 2d 873 (La. 1951).'
The question of the effect of fraud or error upon a contract
is one of ancient origin.2 The general doctrine of early Roman
23. 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
24. 56 So. 2d 308, 310 (La. App. 1952).
1. A case of similar nature is Kackley v. Webber, 310 Ky. 285, 226 S.W.
2d 587 (1949). Cf. Glichester Properties Ltd. v. Gomm, 1 All E.R. 493 (1948);
Kabatchniek v. Hanover-Elm Bldg. Corp., 103 N.E. 2d 692 (Mass. 1952).
2. Oeuvres de Pothier, Annot6es et Mises en Corr6lation avec le Code
Civil et la Legislation, Traite du contrat de vente, nos 233-238, 241 (1861).
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